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To dollarize or not to dollarize? 
In just about a year from now you will have to replace your Dutch 
guilders for euros. You mayor may not have asked yourself the ques-
tion: will this be good for me and for the economy? With the decline 
of its rate against the dollar you may have started to think that this 
euro business is not such a good idea after all. If you are concerned 
about this, let me disappoint you up front. I am not going to discuss 
with you the possible bright and dark spots of a declining euro/dollar 
rate. Something I will address though, is whether the introduction of 
the euro could be part of a global process towards fewer currencies. 
Why should some 185-odd countries all be printing their own money? 
We are moving towards a world with two soft drink companies, two 
major aeroplane manufacturers, three toothpaste producers and an 
increasing concentration of international banking and insurance com-
panies. So why have all those different bank notes? Shouldn't we bet-
ter move towards a world with only a few currency zones? And now 
that we are reducing numbers, why not have just have one single 
world currency, as recently proposed by 1999 Nobel Prize winner 
Robert Mundell (2000)? Such an idea might encounter serious politi-
cal obstacles at the moment, but it could be overtaken by events. The 
Internet has adopted the dollar as its de facto trading currency. With 
the lilcely rapid expansion of Internet sales, maybe countries should 
start anticipating an evolution towards a single world currency? 
Would the world and, more in particular, developing countries gain 
from such a system? 
While the idea of a single world currency fires the imagination, it is 
not my intention to discuss with you a grand new scheme for the 
world financial order, although I will return to the issue towards the 
end. My main focus is more modest - to discuss what would seem to 
be the more appropriate exchange-rate regime from a developmental 
perspective. I witnessed Ecuador's recent move to adopt the US dol-
lar as its official means of exchange from close range. Unlike the 
introduction of the euro, this move was taken overnight in the midst 
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of a severe economic and political crisis. Yet Ecuador's move is not 
just an incident. It fits well into a renewed and fierce debate amongst 
academics and economic policy-malcers about the most appropriate 
exchange-rate regime. Full dollarization, as in Ecuador, is a widely 
propagated option, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, where 
some would like to see the dollar reign 'from Seattle to Santiago' (see, 
for example, Barro 1999). This option is under serious scrutiny by 
policy-malcers in Argentina, Mexico and the Central American coun-
tries, with El Salvador the next probable candidate to malce the move. 
The discussion about the appropriateness of the exchange-rate regime 
is as old as international monetary economics. Thus it is reasonable to 
think that by now this should constitute a simple textbook question for 
every students' Introductory Economics exam. However, as the old 
joke goes, the exam questions in economics remain the same every 
year, it is only the answers that change. l Nothing is less true in rela-
tion to the question of which is the right exchange-rate regime. The 
answer most recently likely to be graded A is to have 'none at all'. 
That is, 'abolish your national currency all together and adopt the 
legal tender of a stable foreign country, such as the US dollar'. Now 
that I seem to have given our new students the answer to an exam 
question, let me also warn them that there may be economics profes-
sors who would give you an F for such an answer. 
The recent currency and financial crises in the so-called emerging 
market economies have triggered much of the renewed debate about 
exchange-rate regimes. Many observers see the management of a 
faulty exchange-rate regime as one of the main causes of Mexico's 
peso crisis in 1994 and of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Prior 
to 1994, Mexico' officially had an announced crawling band within 
which the exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate. The Mexican gov-
ernment had made a strong commitment to keep the exchange rate 
stable within the given range so as to provide a nominal. anchor to its 
macroeconomic policies and to keep inflation low. Mexico was high-
ly praised internationally for this strategy, together with other impor-
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tant reforms it introduced. For all the wrong reasons - or so it 
appeared at the end of 1994, when it was criticized for holding on too 
long to its promise to defend thy peso. When Mexico finally devalued 
it was too little and too late. A crisis was born. Of course, other fac-
tors than the management of the exchange rate were to blame (see 
below). Nevertheless, when the crisis later hit the fast-growing 
economies in East Asia, many observers quicldy put a major part of 
the blame on the de facto peg of the Asian currencies to the dollar. 
These countries had been receiving large capital inflows during the 
1990s, many of which were short-term in nature. Due to the currency 
peg, foreign investors perceived little exchange-rate risk. Of course, 
when the pressure on the exchange rates mounted, the 'hard' peg 
turned out to be 'soft'. Ventures in Asia became much more risky in 
the minds of investors and, as they pulled out en masse, another crisis 
was born. 
Hence, the implicit guarantee given to foreign investors by the 
promise of a fixed exchange rate was seen to be a major underlying 
factor, generating excessive short-term borrowing in dollars and the 
subsequent crisis when the exchange rate fix turned out to be unsus-
tainable. Similar factors have been attributed to the crises in Russia in 
1998 and Brazil in 1999. 
What have we learned from recent experience and earlier history? 
Many economists will argue these days that we are reaching a con-
sensus regarding optimal exchange-rate regimes and that the central 
question is: to fix or not to fix? That is, there are really only two 
extreme options, either you choose a hard peg of your currency to 
some strong foreign currency (such as the dollar) or you keep your 
exchange rate fully flexible (independent floating). This position is 
also called the 'comers approach', because it only allows countries to 
sit on the outside comers of the spectrum of exchange-rate regimes. 
The countries mentioned above nearly all moved to a floating 
exchange-rate regime in response to the crisis. Under such a regime, 
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Jt-'i's better for investors to incorporate the exchange-rate risk in their 
profitability calculations. Brazil, Mexico and several of the East Asian 
countries have shown a good degree of economic recovery of late. So 
those that prefer flex to fix have been quick to assert that the move to 
a fully flexible exchange rate was the right one. However, when 
Indonesia followed its neighbours and switched to a floating 
exchange rate in August 1997, this turned out to be for the worse. The 
exchange rate collapsed, which provoked all those with dollar-denom-
inated debts to seek cover. Domestic inflation ran high and the econ-
omy imploded, leading to mounting social unrest and political insta-
bility. Indonesia's economy is still struggling and its authorities are 
now· considering another exchange regime switch, this time back to a 
truly fixed regime, more in particular a currency board and even dol-
larization. Ecuador also tried to avert the danger of an imminent cur-
rency and banldng crisis by switching from a crawling peg to a float-
ing regime early 1999. It proved to be a recipe for disaster. The finan-
cial system collapsed and the economy plunged into crisis. A year 
later it decided on an even bolder move to the other extreme by 
switching to full dollarization. Like in Indonesia, a president was 
forced out of office along the way and it has left the country much 
impoverished: 
The examples given show that conventions can quickly change and 
miracle stories easily tum into horror stories, even in the minds of 
clever economists. The 'comers approach' of either going for 'fix' or 
for 'fleX:', may thus well tum out to be a 'seesaw approach', as the 
Ecuador and Indonesia examples show. In this context, an increasing 
number of economists have come to the conclusion that in the pre-
sent-day age of high global capital mobility the balance should tilt 
towards 'fix'. And if it is to be 'fix', why not fix once and for all by 
adopting the currency of a strong and stable foreign partner, most typ-
ically the dollar? 
Much of this recent debate focuses on reducing the vulnerability. of 
developing countries to external shocks. Dollarization is:an option at 
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one extreme. Vulnerability to shocks and the danger of financial crises 
can have enormous social costs and set back development for 
decades. A large number of emerging-market economies have suf-
fered such consequences in recent years. This debate about exchange-
rate regimes is therefore also important from a perspective of devel-
opment and poverty reduction. But have economists found a silver 
bullet? Is dollarization the magic trick that will safeguard developing 
countries from large upheavals in the short run and help them to focus 
on long-term development and poverty reduction? I will argue that 
there are contexts which provide strong arguments in favour of dol-
larization. But, one size does not fit all. The fix on the exchange rate 
is not a sufficient condition to greater economic stability and thereby 
more socially responsible macroeconomic policies. So, are there any 
robust answers? Yes, there is one: it all depends. 
What countries actually do 
The changing conventions regarding 'fix' and 'flex' may be discerned 
from Figure 1. The figure refers to developing countries and clearly 
suggests that since the 1970s these have increasingly shifted to away 
from rigid, fixed regimes towards more flexible regimes - either a 
fully flexible system of independent floating or some form of man-
aged floating (see Box 1 for a definition of the spectrum of exchange-
rate regimes). However, in the most recent years it seems there is a 
move back towards more fixed regimes and this reflects the most 
recent convention propagating hard fixes, such as currency boards and 
dollarization. This is the 'seesaw' I just referred to. The figure further 
seems to indicate that the space for intermediate regimes, such as tar-
get zones, or crawling bands and crawling pegs, is increasingly 
reduced, suggesting that the 'corners approach' has become actual 
practice. 
This is somewhat deceiving. In practice, most countries listed as 
floating intervene frequently in their foreign exchange markets, 
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whereas most of those classified as having rigid pegs, have in fact had 
realignments within the past ten years. In Latin America the average 
duration of pegs during the 1980s and 1990s WilS 10 months (Klein 
and Marion 1997). Thus it would be more appropriate to speak of 
'adjustable pegs' and hence of intermediate regimes. Leaving such 
cases aside, but after redefining managed floating regimes and the 
basket pegs as intermediate regimes, we get a much more diverse pic-
ture. This is shown in Figure 2. There does not seem to be much sup-
PQrt for the hypothesis that countries are tending towards the 'corners 
approach'. Intermediate regimes are still very much common practice 
in many contexts, and 'hard fixes' and 'truly free floats' do not appear 
as all absorbing states in practice. 
The rationale for 'dollarization' 
In practice, therefore, countries still appear to apply a wide spectrum 
of exchange regimes. So why do many economists believe that is not 
the best state of affairs and recommend economic policy-makers to sit 
on either corner or even go as far as to' get rid of their own currency 
altogether? The most frequently applied analytical rationale is what 
has been dubbed in the literature as the trilemma in macroeconomic 
policy making. This trilemma - or what you might call the 'impossi-
ble or unholy trinity' - says that a country must give up one of three 
goals: exchange rate stability through a fixed exchange rate, monetary 
indepen'dence, or free capital mobility. In cannot pursue all three at 
the same time.2 If a government tries to pursue all three objectives, it 
will sooner or later be punished by destabilizing capital flows. There 
are many examples of this - the run-up to the Great Depression in the 
1930s, the crisis with several European currencies around 1992, and 
indeed the recent Asian crisis. 
So why, given this trilemma principle, is there only a choice between 
'fix' or 'flex'? The simple argument is that, with an increasingly inte-
-grated global financial market and as countries have liberalized capi-
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tal accounts, the choice is down to two options: either give up 
exchange rate stability in the form of a fix on the value of the curren-
cy or give up monetary independence. In this line of reasoning, capi-
tal controls are not an option. 
I will challenge the solidity of the impossible trinity in a minute. Let 
us take the argument a step further. First, of the choices given, are 
there analytical reasons to prefer 'fix' or 'flex'? And, second, is 'fix' 
good enough, or would countries be better advised to have no 
exchange-rate regime of their own and, rather, adopt the legal tender 
of a foreign country or establish a currency union like the European 
Union? . 
The basic theoretical grounds to choose between fix or flex are linked 
to the basic features of an economy. The seminal reference is a paper 
by Poole (1970) on appropriate monetary policy and lucidly restated 
in Calvo (1999a, 2000) to discuss the appropriate exchange-rate 
regime. Appendix 1 summarizes the basic argument. The standard 
objectives of an exchange-rate regime are twofold: (a) to avoid 
exchange-rate instability, which could discourage trade and invest-
ment; and (b) to provide a nominal anchor for macroeconomic policy 
to avoid inflationary pressures. If an economy is more vulnerable to 
so-called real shocks, such as volatility of commodity prices, then it 
may prefer to have a flexible exchange-rate regime. Adverse shocks 
in commodity prices and terms of trade can generate serious income 
losses, particularly in small, open economies. Devaluation may then 
help cushion the cost of such a shock by restoring the external balance 
and allowing monetary expansion to avoid output losses. If, however, 
an economy is more vulnerable to so-called nominal shocks, such as 
volatility of capital flows, then it may prefer to opt for a fixed 
exchange-rate regime. For instance, ifthe country has a large foreign 
debt, exchange-rate adjustment would increase the debt-servicing 
burden in domestic currency and hence increase fiscal problems 
and/or cause bankruptcy among domestic firms and banks. 
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Now you might say, what about the Asian and other emerging~arket 
economies? They suffered from nominal shocks and yet they were 
told to move to flexible exchange-rate regimes. The missing element 
in the IS-LM model is the notion of moral hazard. As I mentioned, a 
fixed regime provides an implicit guarantee that the government will 
avoid (or implicitly cover) exchange-rate risks to lenders and bor-
rowers in foreign currency. Moral hazard refers to situations where 
people get more recldess if they are somehow protected against the 
consequences of rislcy behaviour. For example, you may be more 
inclined to park your bicycle in neighbourhoods where the chance of 
vandalism or theft is higher if you have had it insured. By the same 
logic, if the exchange-rate regime provides insurance against 
exchange-rate risk it may malce investors less cautious when weigh-
ing all the risks involved in lending in foreign exchange. If the situa-
tion leads to borrowing short in dollars to finance longer-term projects 
say in pesos, investments will suffer from both it currency and a matu-
rity mismatch. Projects will generate earnings over time in local cur-
rency, but financial costs have to be repaid now in dollars. As long as 
the exchange rate stays fixed and the level of foreign exchange 
reserves is adequate, there is no serious problem. But as more debt is 
accumulated, reserves may no longer be enough to ensure payments. 
Domestic investors may start to fear that the exchange-rate fix is no 
longer sustainable and start buying foreign currency to cover their 
exposure. Foreign investors may decide to pull out as the danger of 
debt default looms on the horizon. This is the recipe for a currency 
crisis and the government will probably have to let go of the peg and 
devalue. 
However, governments typically have a problem in choosing the right 
moment to exit the existing exchange rate target or regime. Exiting 
can be politically difficult, so they wait too long. Mexico, Thailand, 
and Korea, for instance, made this mistalce, and only tried to exit 
when reserves ran very low. This precipitated a strong reversal in 
expectations, so that by the time they were willing to adjust the 
exchange rate the combination of interest rates and the exchange rate 
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that would simultaneously be able to reduce the external financial 
constraint and prevent a domestic recession was no longer there.3 
With such a currency mismatch, a full-blown financial crisis is likely 
to follow, as the Asian experience shows. Hence, for some, the moral 
of the moral hazard story would be that you need a floating exchange 
rate, so that investors take proper account of the exchange-rate risk. 
Why isn't fix good enough when riominal shocks predominate? 
Advocates of dollarization (e.g. Hausmann et al. 1999, Calvo 
1999aJb, 2000) argue that a free floating exchange-rate regime is not 
viable for developing countries. Free floating, they argue, tends to 
result in excessive exchange-rate volatility, as hedging in these mar-
kets tends to be highly incomplete. Volatility leads to high interest 
rates, as investors will demand compensation for the higher 
exchange-rate risk. This in itself could attract more speculative capi-
tal flows, but as external debt mounts a fear of depreciation could 
reverse' profitability expectations and investors, fearing depreciation, 
could pullout. The government may seek to defend the currency by 
using its reserves, but this will dry up liquidity in the banking system, 
forcing banks to call in their loans and precipitating a banking crisis 
caused by maturity mismatches. In fact, the crisis becomes self-ful-
filling: if you fear that others may take their money out, you want to 
be the first to do so. This view of foreign exchange and financial mar-
kets is nothing new, of course. Keynes (1936) already saw this in the 
1930s and likened it to a beauty contest. It is not so much about which 
beauty queen you find the most attractive, but rather to guess what the 
average opinion of all the judges or players will be. So market opin-
ion becomes a 'convention', perceptions of what people perceive it to 
be. This can work out fine and be stable in 'normal times', but be 
highly destabilizing in 'abnormal times' as opinion may shift quickly 
in the face of bad news.4 This 'mass psychology of a large number of 
ignorant individuals', as Keynes called it, is the fundament of the 
herding behaviour and contagion effects in financial markets that 
economists talk about nowadays.s 
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So if exchange rates seem to create such illusions and pekrse mar-
ket responses, why not get rid of them altogether? Dollarization (or 
'euroization') could do the trick: it will eliminate - by definition - all 
exchange-rate risk. But not only that. It deprives irresponsible gov-
ernments of the possibility to print more money to finance unsustain-
able fiscal deficits or bailout domestic debtors through debt deflation. 
Further, it deprives central banlcs of their capacity to act as lender of 
last resort, thereby further limiting the possibility of any bail-out of 
excessive risk taleing by banlcs and firms. A currency board (see Box 
1), as established in Argentina, Hong Kong, Bulgaria and the Baltic 
States, comes close to what dollarization would achieve. The 
exchange rate would no longer be fixed by policy but by law, and the 
country would only issue national currency when fully backed by for-
eign currency (the dollar). Some have argued, however, that not even 
a currency board may achieve full credibility. If put under sufficient 
pressure, the country could change its laws. There is still the danger 
of speculative attacks. Argentine financial assets, for instance, have 
continued to show substantial interest rate differentials with foreign 
ventures, and capital inflows have been highly volatile. During the 
recent crises in the international markets, both Argentina and Hong 
Kong have allowed the one-for-one coverage of national currency 
with dollars to drop at the margin, to stave off speculative attacks.6 
Some of you may view the whole idea of dollarization as an attempt 
to formalize monetary colonialism, a final stage of the global patterns 
that emerged in the nineteenth century. Or, you may find that 
denouncing your own currency is a major attack on your national 
integrity. Yet advocates of official dollarization will argue that this is 
beating a dead horse. People in many developing countries already 
use dollars in large quantities for their transactions. Two-thirds of all 
dollar currency is held outside the United States and about three-quar-
ters of increases in dollar cash holdings talce place outside the US 
(Bergsten 1999). De facto dollarization of most transition economies 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as in many 
parts of Latin America has been estimated at 30-60% of deposit hold-
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ings in these countries (Balifio, Bennet and Borenzstein 1999). 
Liability dollarization is usually even larger (ibid and Calvo 1999a). 
The advocates of dollarization argue that this is evidence that the ben-
efits of maintaining a national currency are outweighed by the bene-
fits of adopting someone else's. Further, it makes monetary policy vir-
tually ineffective. In terms of the trilemma, it means one has already 
eliminated one policy option. Thus why not tum a de facto dollariza-
tion into a policy dollarization? 
So we have at least four good reasons to dollarize: the unholy trinity, 
the beauty contest in financial markets and the danger of unhedged 
dollar liabilities, the political difficulty of exiting a regime with 
exchange rate targets, and high levels of de facto dollarization. So if 
these are such strong and good reasons, should we advise many other 
countries to follow Ecuador's example? 
The case of Ecuador 
Early this year, Ecuador decided to make the bold move towards offi-
cial dollarization. It instantly made Kurt Vonnegut's science fiction 
novel Galapagos visionary. As the author wrote, looking back from a 
million years in the future: 'Mere opinions, in fact, were as likely to 
govern people's actions as hard evidence, and were subject to sudden 
reversals as hard evidence could never be. So the Galapagos Islands 
could be hell in one moment and heaven in the next, and Julius Caesar 
could be a statesman in one moment and a butcher in the next, and 
Ecuadorian paper money could be traded for food, shelter, and cloth-
ing in one moment and line the bottom of a birdcage in the next. .. ' 
(Vonnegut 1985: 17). 
Ecuador's decision was talcen amidst economic and political chaos. 
When the decision was talcen, political reasons probably were more 
important than economic considerations. In fact, until a few days. 
before the actual decision in early January, both the president and the 
\. 
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board of governors had expressed their explicit opposition to the idea 
of dollarization. Yet something needed to be done. By the end of 1999, 
the exchange rate had run out of control (as I said, under a floating 
regime),? after the country had already suffered a year of deep eco-
nomic crisis and a collapse of the banking system. The bad econom-
ic climate was ushered in by a couple of severe external shocks dur-
ing 1997-98, including the El Nino phenomenon and the steep drop in 
the price of oil, the country's major export product.s <:We all have 
short memories, so you may have forgotten that at the time oil could 
be bought at only 7 dollars a barrel!) I have described the background 
to the causes of crisis elsewhere (see endnote 8). 
While the option of dollarization was under discussion behind closed 
doors for some time, the decision was made rather impulsively. Social 
pressures mounted against the government's impotence to deal with 
the crisis and the public demanded the president's head. On 5 January 
2000 the government first announced it would malce a radical shift in 
macroeconomic policies, but ended up saying it would not dollarize 
and nothing else. Nobody could be fooled this way of course and four 
days later - in an attempt to save his' political life the president 
announced the move towards official dollarization. This did not save 
his political neck, but he did leave the legacy of eliminating the 
national currency and introducing the greenback 
The decision to dollarize was thus strongly politically loaded. Yet 
from what I have said, there were good economic arguments to sug-
gest such a move: exchange was out of control, inflation was running 
high and monetary policies had lost all credibility. Moreover, more 
than half of deposits and two-thirds of credits in the banking system 
were already dollar-denominated by 1999 (see Figure 3). In addition, 
the largest dollar stocks in the country were probably held in a ban1c 
popularly called Colch6nbanco (everyone's mattress). 
These factors stand out on the 'top 10' checklist of reasons why coun-
tries could consider dollarizing (see Table 1, reasons 2 and 3). 
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Ecuador also complies with criterion 4, which is strong financial and 
trade links with the US economy.9 However, it scores less strongly on 
the other points. Historically, shocks in Ecuador come mainly through 
its dependence on primary export commodities and its vulnerability to 
extreme weather conditions (reason I), They are therefore predomi-
nantly 'real' rather than 'nominal'. Adjustment to such shocks may be 
less costly with a flexible exchange rate than with a fixed one. This 
could be challenged though, given the country's large foreign debt 
and high proportion of liability dollarization, which played a role in 
the build up to the current banking crisis. More clearly, Ecuador's 
business cycle does not really move consistently with that of. the US 
(reason 5)10, in that US monetary policy will not talee any account of 
the business cycle in the dollarized economy. Furthermore, Ecuador 
has no solid fiscal system (reason 6), it had low reserves to effectuate 
dollarization (7), no adequate banle supervision (8), supposedly rigid 
labol.}f markets (9),11 and - as I explained - there was initially no clear 
political support for surrendering monetary independence (10) and 
there is still opposition today. 
There is no single theoretical model to give proper weight to each of 
these factors. Ecuador's overwhelming concerns were to restore the 
credibility ofits economic policies and to fend off political instabili-
ty. Advocates of dollarization tend to give little weight to the criteria 
that involve institutional reforms. They believe that dollarization will 
do the trick. By throwing out the money printing press with ,<the 
garbage, authorities will be forced towards greater fiscal discipline, 
better regulation of the banking system and the introduction of labour 
market reforms. Dollarization not only puts you on a diet, it also 
changes your lifestyle! But does it? In the short run, policy-initiated 
dollarization is like the strictest of diets.12 You wire your mouth shut 
to lose weight. But unless you change your life-style (such as your 
eating habits and getting more exercise), you do not become healthi-
er. You just get thinner, or end up suffering from anorexia. 
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Has Ecuador already lost some weight? Yes, it has. Inflation 
approached an annual rate of 70% by the end of 1999 and by January 
2000 the monthly rate stood at about 6%. Worrisome for sure, but 
nowhere near hyperinflation levels. 13 After dollarization was 
announced, inflation went up, not down (Figure 4). This was due to 
an implementation failure. The conversion rate was set at 25,000 
sucres a dollar, the peak nominal exchange rate during the speculative 
weeks prior to the regime switch. Not much analysis had gone into 
setting this conversion rate, but the authorities were probably afraid 
that they had insufficient dollar reserves to effectuate the switch. By 
setting the rate high, fewer dollars would be needed to convert the 
stock of sucres in circulation.14 They did not (or did not want to) take 
into account the Colch6nbanco, as a source of dollars. And this came 
with a price. It implied a de facto devaluation of probably at least 50% 
of the market rate before the speculative attack. This pushed up infla-
tion, peaking at 15% per month in March 2000. Since then, monthly 
inflation rates have fallen but not as steeply as the diet ads promised. 
Some overshooting of the initial exchange rate effect, a shortage of 
dollar coins for small change and gradual adjustment of controlled 
prices are probably key factors in explaining why the cumulative 
annual inflation rate has continued to rise, pealdng at over 100%. 
Interest rates are still high and real wages have fallen steeply (Figure 
5). Greater stability is thus only coming slowly. Equally, despite high 
oil prices, there has only been a very slight output recovery since July. 
Clearly, 'the Ecuadorian economy - and the people - have been diet-
ing, but they have not seen instantaneous miracle effects. The next 
question is whether the straightjacket of dollarization has been able to 
force institutional change. It is too early to judge, but at least several 
important reforms are on the agenda. Politics in Ecuador is notori-
ously complicated, so it will probably be a slow - and certainly a dif-
ficult - process. It raises the issue for other countries that may be 
thinldng of following Ecuador's example, or of establishing currency 
unions: should they follow the Nike strategy and 'just do it' ?Or 
should they follow a more euro-like process of gradually changing 
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institutions and economic integration before malting the monetary 
regime switch? I would like to look at some of these issues in more 
detail. 
Dollarization and socially responsible macro policies: 
a sceptical view 
As I said much of the recent debate on exchange-rate regimes has 
emerged in response to the recent financial crises across the globe. 
The right regime is the one that minimizes adjustment cost and vul-
nerability to external shocks. In the view of some, dollarization is the 
winner. It would not only eliminate forever the risk of speculative 
attacks on the domestic currency, but would also deprive undisci-
plined governments of the possibility of running to the printing press 
when. they see no way out and, in doing so, making matters worse. 
Whenever economists propose a uniform recipe, be sceptical. Simple 
answers do not exist and medicine that may work miracles in one con-
text may prove a recipe for disaster in another. So let's look at some 
of the main ingredients. I will discuss four major issues here: (1) the 
degrees of freedom for socially responsible macroeconomic policy 
making; (2) the role of capital controls; (3) fiscal adjustment; and (4) 
the need for institutional reforms. For other relevant issues, such as 
the cost associated with destroying your own printing press, I refer to 
the recent literature on this matter. IS 
a How holy is the unholy trinity? 
The trilemma argument states that you can't have a fixed exchange 
rate, independent monetary policy and free capital mobility all at the 
same time. With the growing integration of international financial 
markets, economists argue that the choice is down to two: you give up 
either exchange rate stability (flex) or monetary independence (fix). 
But many countries do something else: they give up a bit of both. This 
is what you get when you opt for an intermediate regime, such as a 
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crawling band. Instead of going for the comers, you can opt for a 
solution somewhere between.16 As indicated above, the reason to 
choose to sit on one of the comers has more to do with the problems 
associated with the beauty contest in financial markets and histories 
of high inflation and low policy credibility. Thus depending on the 
weight one wishes to give to these factors, the comer solution, includ-
ing dollarization, may be more or less attractive. Empirical evidence 
does not provide us with any clearer answers. Advocates of dollariza-
tion, such as Hausmann et al. (1999), present evidence that economies 
with truly fixed regimes (currency boards, dollarization) outperform 
those without, by showing greater economic stability, lower inflation, 
higher financial intermediation, and higher growth. This is refuted by 
other evidence, which suggests that growth spurts are· associated with 
more flexible exchange-rate regimes (Rodrik 2000, Williamson 
1999). However, all of this evidence shows a lack of robustness across 
samples and periods (Edwards and Savastano 1998, Mussa et al. 
2000). 
Also, views on the performance of individual countries may differ. 
Argentina will be cited by some as the textbook example of a country 
that managed .to overcome a long history of high inflation and irre-
sponsible macroeconomic management by fixing its exchange rate 
one-to-one to the US dollar through a currency board. It achieved high 
growth rates and avoided a currency crisis during the 1990s (e.g. 
Hausmann et al. 1999). Nevertheless, growth has been volatile and 
adjustment to shocks, such as the 1995 tequila crisis, provoked strong 
quantity adjustment in the form of a steep rise in unemployment. 
Despite positive growth, Argentina now has more unemployment and 
poverty than before its currency board was set up (Taylor and Vos 
2000, Frenkel and Gonzalez 2000). Since Brazil's crisis in 1999, 
Argentina has been stuck in a recession, hemmed in. by its currency 
board and deteriorated competitiveness. Brazil itself devalued and 
recovered well. Argentina's flirt with dollarization seems to have 
cooled down somewhat in face of this harsh evidence.17 
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b Are capital controls bad? 
The Asian crisis shattered the a priori view that a globalized financial 
market would allocate capital efficiently and thereby boost growth to 
countries that had liberalized capital flows. Even the IMF has soft-
ened its opposition to capital controls. IS Particularly countries that . / 
wish to enjoy the benefits of fixed exchange rates should either install v 
some system of capital controls, in order to limit vulnerability to spec-
ulation and private capital flow vulnerability, or adopt a well-cement-
ed fix in the form of a currency board or dollarization to eliminate 
exchange-rate risk. However, while dollarization will el4ninate 
exchange-rate risks, it will not eliminate volatility of capital flows and 
subsequent dangers of domestic banking crises. As I indicated before, 
moral hazard and beauty contests are inherent to the functioning of 
financial markets and hence the risk of default will still be there, even 
in the absence of exchange-rate risk. Despite their credible fix, coun-
tries like Argentina, Hong Kong and Panama suffered at least equally 
strong falls in capital inflows as elsewhere following the Mexican 
peso crisis and the Asian crisis. Next to the credit rationing, persistent 
substantial spreads between domestic and foreign dollar-denominated 
assets also reflect perceived default risk.19 Capital controls, if man-
aged properly, thus may help to provide some protection against 
excessive exposure and sudden reversals of flows as investors' fancies 
and fears fluctuate with the fashion of the day. Dollarization is thus 
not a full substitute for capital controls and there is good reason to 
continue to take interest in alternative ways to stem volatility of short-
term capital flows, as adopted by countries like Chile, Colombia, 
Malaysia, and, in different forms, China and India during the 1990s.20 
c Anti-cyclical fiscal policies 
In a dollarized economy, adverse external shocks will have to be 
accommodated by domestic demand contraction. This can be 
achieved by cutting nominal wages and/or fiscal retrenchment. 
Adjustment in the short run will thus immediately affect people 
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through falling income, rising unemployment, or both. In most con-
texts, it is politically difficult and probably undesirable to achieve full 
flexibility of nominal wages. Fiscal revenues in most developing 
countries are strongly pro-cyclical, as they rely heavily on expendi-
ture-based taxes. Tax reforms take time and are equally difficult to 
implement politically. Thus, without the option of running to the 
printing press, most of the adjustment process is likely to start with 
cuts in public expenditures. The economic downturn this provokes 
will eat into tax income and adjustment may end up in a downward 
spiral. In other words, while dollarization frees us from the phantom 
of inflation, it may produce a monster called prolonged recession 
when the global economic climate is bad. To avoid having to choose 
all too often between two such evils, dollarized countries should con-
sider installing fiscal stabilization funds and other contingent fiscal 
rules, such that fiscal spending can be levelled out over economic 
upswings and downturns.2! 
d Institutional reforms 
Can official dollarization force the required institutional reforms? 
Will the 'Nilce' strategy get things done in an ordered manner? Or 
should we see dollarization as the 'crown' of a process where all 
required institutional reforms have been put in place first, like we 
have done in euroland? Clearly, the Nike strategy may have its advan-
tages, particularly when long-needed reforms have proven to be polit-
ically d\.fficult. Ecuador is a clear-cut example. Dollarization has put 
to rest a long history of extremely lenient lender-of-Iast resort policies 
by the central bank. That is, the money printing press was doing over-
time whenever it was necessary to repair the liquidity shortages of pri-
vate banks.22 This reform has come instantaneously. But is it possible 
to do away entirely with the lender-of-Iast-resort function in a dollar-
ized economy? Of course not. As the US needs one to safeguard 
against the risk of a banldng crisis, Ecuador will need one, too. To be 
more precise, even in a dollarized economy and without a central 
banlc, there is still some scope to lend in last resort. The government 
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could do so by using fiscal resources, but from what I have said above, 
this role will necessarily be limited and may well end up in a down-
ward economic spiral, throwing good money after bad. An alternative, 
as is the case in Panama, is to turn the function over to US banks res-
ident in the country (Moreno-Villalaz 2000). This begs the question 
whether the public interest is necessarily served under such a con-
struction.23 
As the scope for providing lender-of-Iast-resort services is limited by 
dollarization, adequate banking supervision and a strengthened bank-
ing system are even more crucial than otherwise, so as to red,uce the 
need for such services. Preferably one would like to have this in place 
before dollarizing. There is, however, a dollarization-first school (e.g. 
Hausmann et aI. 1999) which says that by eliminating the currency 
risk, dollarization will help to strengthen banldng systems with severe 
currency and maturity mismatches with a single stroke of the pen. 
UnfortUnately, life is not that easy. Again: financial market beauty 
contests can still lead to excessive risk taldng by investors and to sud-
den reversals. Hence, banking crises can occur even without per-
ceived currency risk.24 Effectively functioning bank supervision and 
regulation are not created overnight and, where vested banking inter-
ests are strong (even when the bankers are broke), such as in Ecuador, 
costly bail,.outs may continue to prevail over measures that serve the 
long-run stability of the financial system.25 
Finally, dollarization will require a more flexible labour market. 
Under a flexible exchange-rate regime a terms-of-trade shock can be 
cushioned by adjusting the exchange rate. With a hard fix or dollar-
ization, the necessary shift in relative domestic prices will require a 
fall in nominal prices, including nominal wages. Will social actors be 
willing to accept nominal wage cuts? This appears to be hard in prac-
tice. Thus, dollarization or the introduction of a hard peg, such as 
Argentina's currency board, do not automatically lead to labour mar-
ket reform. In Panama, labour market reform is still a major cause of 
controversy and difficult to implement, even after almost a century of 
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dollarization.26 In Argentina, a new labour law introducing greater 
flexibility in hiring and fIring practices was not passed until early this 
year, a decade after the currency board was introduced. Even so, wage 
bargaining in Argentina remains highly centralized and unemploy-
ment has been over 15% of the labour force for many years now. 
Ecuador's wage-setting system is no less rigid (and no reforms have 
been achieved yet since dollarization), but labour market flexibility 
there comes through low shares of wage employment and a large 
informal sector operating as a 'sink' for the labour market. Either way, 
downward wage flexibility or quantity adjustment (unemployment, 
informal employment), will be bad news for ordinary people in the 
advent of adverse external shocks. A recent study of 17 Latin 
American countries has shown that wage declines, unemployment 
increases and expanding informal sector employment are the single 
most important factors explaining increases in poverty and inequality 
during the 1990s.27 
. Socially responsible macro policies will have to take account of the 
nature of the exchange-rate regime. As I said, adjustment will have a 
different impact on -wages and unemployment, and on social spend-
ing, under a hard exchange-rate regime than under a flexible one. 
Under dollarization, adjustment will essentially be through quantities 
in the face of adverse shocks (rising unemployment and expanding 
informal sector employment). Under such a regime social safety nets 
would need a greater emphasis on unemployment insurance, employ-
ment programmes or micro-enterprise credits. Under a more flexible 
exchange-rate regime, exchange-rate adjustment could help cushion 
output losses, but at the price of rising inflation. Thus, under flex, 
inflation would constitute a greater short-run risk for the welfare of 
the poor, and social protection would have to come through wage 
adjustment or targeted transfer programmes to help protect poor 
against the immediate effects of external shocks.28 
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In short, if dollarization is a diet, it may certainly make you lose con-
siderable weight, but will by no means automatically change your 
lifestyle. 
Concluding remarks 
Returning to my initial question: should developing countries give up 
their weak currencies by adopting a strong foreign currency as legal 
tender? Clearly, there is no single, simple answer that suits all coun-
tries. In a sense we are back to square one: it all depend~! Fixed 
exchange rates or dollarization may make sense for small, open 
economies in desperate need for monetary and financial stability. 
Dollarization might allow them to import such stability. Ecuador was . 
in need of stability and made the decision to dollarize almost 
overnight. Suriname cd@.d be an example of a country that might 
want to consider official dollarization for the very same reason. But 
success, as we have seen in the case of Ecuador, does not come instan-
taneously and the real challenge of changing its lifestyle yet has to 
begin: Dollarization will increase the pressure to introduce the neces-
sary institutional reforms, but these will not come by themselves. The 
'just do it' strategy can be risky. From a perspective of socially 
responsible macroeconomic policies Ecuador will need to establish 
adequate mechanisms to cope with external shocks and subsequent 
crises. If not, it could be a dangerous strategy and the diet may cause 
economic anorexia. If it works, however, it may get rid of decades of 
poor economic management. Despite the risks, now that dollarization 
has become a reality, Ecuador can better get on with it and meet the 
challenge. Other countries considering the move, such as Argentina, 
Indonesia and some Central American countries, and who knows? 
Suriname, had better consider the implications well. 
L 
Reducing exchange-rate risks in a world with increasing capital L-
mobility is an attractive option. However, even with a single world 
currency, the world is unlikely to be freed of the risk of financial 
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crises. The nature of the exchange-rate regime is just one element in 
this game. Moreover, the world is not an optimal currency area; radi-
cal institutional reforms of the world's financial architecture would be 
required before we could reap the benefits of getting rid of all nation-
al currencies. The same holds true for other options, such as regional 
currency unions. At best, these should be one item on the agenda for 
reforms of the international financial system. However important, a 
particular exchange-rate regime will not single-handedly give you the 
silver bullet that will solve all the problems of macroeconomic poli-
cy-making. 
The fascination of many economists today for the 'comer solutions' 
is therefore overdone. 'To fix or not to fix' - that is not the question. 
As long as economists do not fully consider the broader agenda, the 
conventional wisdom about the appropriate exchange-rate regime is 
likely to continue to be as volatile as capital flows to emerging-mar-
ket economies. Equally the attraction of dollarization or a potential 
future 'euroization' will continue to be subject to changing conven-
tions. To once again quote Kurt Vonnegut, who is not an economist of 
course: 'The national currency of all· six guests in the EI Dorado 
[hotel], the four Americans, one claiming to be Canadian, and the two 
Japanese, were still as good as gold everywhere on the planet. Again: 
the value of their money was imaginary. Like the nature of the uni-
verse itself, the desirability of their American dollars and yens was all 
in the people's heads.' (Vonnegut 1985: 30). 
, 
No matter how imaginary, the colour of money clearly matters to 
development. Whether the colour is a good fit, however, depends on 
what else we are wearing. 
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Box 1 
Definition of exchange-rate regimes from fix to flex! 
Fixed corner: 
1. Currency union (38): adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender, including official dollar-
ization. [Examples: the Euro 11, 14 members of CFA zone" Panama (since 1904), Ecuador 
(since 2000), and several island economies]. 
2. Currency board (8): country has own currency, but exchange rate is fixed by law, rather than 
by policy. Monetary base is backed one-for-one by foreign exchange reserves, and money 
supply changes follow balance of payments adjustment. [Examples: Hong Kong (since 1983), 
Argentina (1991), Estonia (1992), Lithuania (1994), Bulgaria (1997) and Bosnia (1998). 
Brunei and Djibouti have had currency boards since independence.] 
3. Hard peg (31)': exchange rate is fixed by policy, but with the firm and lasting intention to 
keep a given exchange rate with a commitment to buy or sell the foreign currency necessary. 
[Examples: Mainland China, Egypt]. 
Intermediate regimes 
4. Adjustable peg': exchange rate is fixed, but without open-ended commitment to resist deval-
uation or revaluation if there is a large balance of payments disequilibrium. 
5. Crawling peg (6): pre-announced adjustment of the exchange rate (vis-a-vis a single curren-
cy, usually the dollar) at a given frequency (day, week, etc.). [Examples: Angola, Costa Rica, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Thrkey and)funisia.] 
6. Basket peg (13): exchange rate is not fixed to a single foreign currency, but to a weighted 
average of currencies of major trading partners [Examples: many Asian countries, at least 
officially, prior to 1997-8 crisis; Botswana, Kuwait, Morocco.] 
7. Target zone or (crawling) band (17): exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within a band 
around some central rate; if central rate is adjusted, the band 'crawls'. [Examples: Brazil, 
Colombia, .and Mexico prior to crises in 1999 or 1994. Others include: Chile, Israel, Uruguay, 
Poland and Hungary.] 
Flex corner 
8. Managedfloat (25): there is no specific target for the exchange rate, but monetary authorities 
intervene if rate is moving in an undesired manner or is prone to large fluctuations. 
[Examples: Czech Republic, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Russia, Suriname.] 
9. Independent or free-floating (47): there is no specific target for the exchange rate and no reg-
ular interventioJ!. in foreign exchange market. [Examples: Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Korea, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines after their currency crises; also United States, Canada.] 
Source:Frankel (1999) and IMF, International Financial Statistics (1999 Annual Report). 
Note: 1. The number of countries are in parenthesis after label for each type of regime (as per April 
1999 with a few adjustments for changes since). 
2. The CFA countries in Africa have a currency union tied to the French franc. In 1994 they 
devalued against the franc after 46 years at a fixed rate, though they retained the currency 
union amongst themselves. 
3. Including de facto peg arrangements under regime which are officially labelled as managed 
floating (IMF lists 13 countries in this category, including Mainland China). Also includes the 
case with an 'adjustable peg' 
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Table 1 
Top 10 checldist for dollarization inEcnador 
2. High degree of de facto dollarization of economy 
4. Symmetry of business cycles and shocks with 
partner country's currency (US$) 
10. Political willingness to give up monetary 
independence for US's monetary credibility 
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Appendix 1 
Choosing the appropriate exchange-rate regime:· 
'fix'versus 'flex' in a simple IS-LM framework 
Following Poole (1970) and Calvo (1999a, 2000) one can layout the 
bare bones of the Mundell-Fleming model with two markets (goods 
and money), as follows. In summary form, the model has two basic 
equations: 
(1) y = ae + u 
(2) m = y + v 
where y, e, and m, are respectively domestic output, the nominal 
exchange rate, and the nominal stock of money, all expressed as logs. 
The other variables in equations (1) and (2) refer respectively to 
(exogenous) stochastic variables u and v, and parameter a (> 0). For 
sake of simplicity, and following Calvo (1999a), the price of domes-
tic output is assumed constant and normalized to unity (and hence 0 
in terms oflogs). 
The IS curve is defined through equation (1). For simplicity, the inter-
est-rate effects are lumped together under the stochastic term u. The 
LM curve is represented by equation (2), where the demand for money 
is assumed to be unit-elastic with output and, again, the effects of the 
interest rate are subsumed in the stochastic term v. 
I· 
Under a fixed exchange-rate regime: 
• the exchange rate, e, will be a constant, and y and m will be 
endogenous. 
Under a floating exchange-rate regime: 
• the nominal stock of money, m, will be a constant, and y and e will 
be endogenous. 
30 
Thus under a fixed regime: 
(3) var y = a~ and var e = 0 
And under a floating regime: 
(4) var y = a~ and var e = 1."..{ 0:2 + a2 + 2pa a ) rl\ u y u y 
where au and ay are the standard deviations of stochastic variables u 
and v, and p is the correlation coefficient between u and v. 
Now if the main objective of the foreign exchange regime Were to 
minimize output variations (var y), it follows from equation expres-
sions (3) and (4) that the optimal solution depends on the volatilities 
of what have been called real shocks (aij) and nominal shocks (a~), j . 
respectively. It follows, from this simple framework, that if the 
volatility of nominal shocks is larger than the volatility of real shocks, 
then a fixed exchange-rate regime is better in terms of minimizing 
variability of output. Inversely, if real shocks predominate, a flexible 
exchange-rate regime would be better. 
Capital account shocks (volatility due to capital mobility) affect both 
the IS and LM curves, hence there is probably positive association 
between real and nominal shocks (p > 0). For instance, a surge in cap-
ital inflows will increase domestic demand for goods and money 
demand. If nominal shocks become more prominent, the volatility of 
the exchange rate will go up, and thereby transaction costs for inter-
national trade and finance. Under the model assumptions, it would be 
better to opt for a fixed exchange rate or even full dollarization. 
Economies with a relatively low level of integration into global finan-
cial markets and hence likely to be subject to greater real shocks (such 
as terms of trade volatility), might be better off with a more flexible 
exchange-rate regime. Through exchange-rate adjustment and mone-
tary expansion they will be able to offset the negative output effects 
of adverse trade shocks. Still, these conditions do not necessarily 
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imply the corner solution. The regime options may range from fully 
independent floating to some form of a managed float, or a peg with 
an exit option. 
As explained in the text, the model framework laid out here only pro-
vides a basic reference. Other basic factors relating to conditions of 
international trade and finance, as well as country-specific conditions, 
have to be talcen into consideration. 
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Endnotes 
1 See, for instance, Berg and Borenzstein (2000) and Frankel, 
Schrnulder and Serven (2000), who also refer to this old joke. 
2 The principle of the trilemma is based on the standard Mundell-
Fleming IS-LM model for open economies. 
3 See for a further discussion of the problem of exiting exchange-
rate strategies, Eichengreen and Masson (1998) and Haussman 
et aI. (1999), and Frankel, Schrnulder and Serven (2000) and 
Williamson (1999) for challenges to the view that the exiting 
problem would be an argument to 'sit on the comers'. 
4 And, in doing so, players can be disaster myopic, because, as 
Keynes writes: 'Worldly wisdom teaches that is better for rep-
utation to fail conventionally, than to succeed unconventional-
ly.' (Keynes 1936: 158.) For the normal state of affairs, Keynes 
contends that '[s]peculators may do no harm as bubbles on a 
steady stream of enterprise'. But in less normal times ' ... the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes a bubble on a 
whirlpool of speculation.' (Keynes 1936: 159.) 
5 See also Vos (1994) for further discussion and references. 
6 The examples show that also a currency board could potential-
ly be overthrown by speculative attacks. During the 1995 tequi-
la crisis,\Argentina's monetary authorities temporarily reduced 
dollar reserve coverage of the monetary base, thus providing 
banks with dollar credits to stay afloat. The Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority used reserves on the margin and intro-
duced a discount window in September 1998 to provide short-
term liquidity to banks. See Balifio, Bennett and Borenzstein 
(1999) for further discussion. 
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7 The effective nominal exchange rate devalued by alniost 200% 
during the year. 
8 See Vos (2000) for an analysis of the factors that led to a build 
up of Ecuador's economic crisis during the 1990s. Izurieta 
(2000) gives a detailed study of the longstanding perverse inter-
action between private banldng sector lending behaviour and 
the central banlc's role as lender oflast resort. Vos, Velasco and 
De Labastida (1998) describe the economic and social conse-
quences of the EI Nino phenomenon, while Vos et al. (2000) 
describe the social consequences of the crisis and the options of 
improved social protection schemes. 
9 Recent empirical studies, based on modem versions of 
Linnemann:s gravitation model (Linnemann 1966), find robust 
results of a positive impact of currency unions on trade expan-
sion and integration (see e.g. Frankel and Rose 2000). 
10 The existence of so-called asymmetric shocks is the standard 
argument against currency unions as no optimal currency area 
would exist. Mundell (1961) first raised the point. See also 
McKinnon (1962, 2000). 
11 That is, there is a high degree of nominal wage rigidity and 
labour markets are strongly segmented. It could be argued 
though in the case of Ecuador that, with a low share of wage 
'labour (less than half the workforce) and the informal sector 
acting as a residual employer, labour markets are in effect 
rather flexible (see Vos 2000). 
12 The metaphor is due to Catherine Mann (1999). 
13 Arguably, economists tend to tallc of hyperinflation when prices 
increase at a monthly rate of 50% or more, which would 
amount to over 12,000% on an annual basis. A 6% monthly rate 
translates to 190% annually. 
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14 Deflating the value of sucre deposits in the ailing banks was 
probably another consideration. Bank deposits had been frozen 
for almost a year since the banking crisis broke out in March 
2000. Several banks were led into banlcruptcy, while others had 
to be taken over by the deposit insurance agency (AGD). 
Deposit holders would receive their money back (up to a cer-
tain amount). The original plan was to finance the money return 
through the printing press and foreign borrowing. With the 
printing press gone, it was possible to limit the required dollar 
resources for the refund by a high conversion rate. Of course, 
deposit holders lost much of their wealth in the process: rough-
ly three-quarters of the value in dollar terms compared to what 
they had just before the Jbreak out of the banldng crisis. 
15 One of the benefits for a country of printing its own money is 
that it provides the government with a source of revenue. 
Currency can be thought of as a debt which carries no interest. 
With that debt the government can purchase assets (such as for-
eign exchange reserves or loans to the banking sector) or 'con-
sume' it by financing its fiscal deficit. Hence, the authorities 
make an implicit profit which economists call 'seigniorage'. 
The flow of seigniorage is usually measured by the increase in 
base money. See any macroeconomics textbook for definitions. 
With dollarization countries would loose the benefits of this 
annual flow of revenue, as well as the stock of outstanding 
money wtth the public that will have to be purchased to be con-
verted to dollars. In most countries with low inflation, the annu-
al flow of seigniorage typically amounts to about 0.3% of GDP, 
while the initial cost of converting the domestic cun'ency held 
outside the central bank could typically run up to around 5% of 
GDP. With dollarization, seigniorage would accrue to the US 
for the money it issues and which is held by citizens of dollar-
ized economies. Countries considering dollarization will 
expect the benefits of giving up the printing press, such as low 
inflation and stability, to vastly outweigh the cost of the loss of 
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seigniorage. Even so, countries could try establish a treaty with 
the US to regulate shared seigniorage. Argentina has tried to 
obtain such an arrangement, but the US has not responded pos-
itively to this idea. The US also has no sharing arrangement 
with Panama. The existing precedent of such an arrangement is 
that between South Africa and three other countries that use the 
rand as currency (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia). See, for 
example, Calvo (2000) and Berg and Borenzstein (2000) for 
further discussion. 
16 Williamson (1999), Frankel (1999), and Rodrik (2000) are 
among those that continue to see intermediate regimes as the 
better choice in most cases. 
17 Other evidence from Latin America suggests that countries that 
managed to preserve competitive exchange rates generally 
showed better relative export performance and less pronounced 
trends towards rising income inequality associated with trade 
liberalization. However, despite this positive correlation it 
would be too simplistic to give the exchange-rate regime all the 
benefit. It plays but one role in a larger drama. See Taylor and 
Vos (2000) for a discussion and overview of the evidence. 
18 Michael Mussa (2000), economic counsellor at the IMP, 
recently pointed out that ' ... the experience in recent financial 
crises could cause reasonable people to question whether liber-
I al policies toward international capital flows are wise for all 
countries in all circumstances. The answer, I believe, is proba-
bly not.' 
19 What is more, in the third quarter of 2000, Argentina initiated 
negotiations on a large loan programme with the IMP and the 
multilateral banks. If agreed, it will btl the largest external bail-
out since Brazil's in January 1999. Interest rates on Argentine 
bonds are 10 percentage points over the return· on US bonds, 
reflecting default risk rather than fears of devaluation. The 
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strong dollar, and hence peso, has become a damaging factor. 
The inability to inject money continues to strangulate the stag-
nant economy. 
20 See among others, Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Montiel and 
Reinhart (1999) and Griffith-Jones (1998) for detailed discus-
sions of alternative approaches to capital controls in developing 
countries. 
21 Stabilization funds have proven to be effective in several con-
texts, such as Chile's Copper Compensation Fund and 
Colombia's Oil Stabilization Fund. Of course if shocks are 
large and prolonged, these solutions will find their limit, as felt 
by Chile with the collapse of world copper prices in the late 
1990s. Thus, such funds can be helpful stabilizers, but with 
very large shocks additional cushions may be required (such as 
borrowing from the multilateral development banks). 
22 See Izurieta (2000) for a thorough analysis of this process. 
23 Another option, suggested by Hausmann and Powell (2000), 
would be to use a seigniorage sharing arrangement to maintain 
a stock of reserves. This could be done through a currency swap 
arrangement or, if the seigniorage is paid in annual amounts, 
the flow could be used to collaterize a contingent liquidity fund 
facility with US banks or the US authorities. The key to this 
solution would be to have such a sharing arrangement through 
a treaty With the US. However, the political feasibility of such 
solution is at present still remote. 
24 See Berg and Borenzstein (2000) and Eichengreen (2000) for 
discussions of the empirical literature on exchange rates and 
banking crises. The evidence shows that a more stable 
exchange rate or hard pegs do not malce for fewer banking 
crises. 
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II/ 
1'1 
i 
25 Ecuador has traditionally had an independent banlc supervisory 
institution (Superintendencia de Bancos). However, the super-
intendent has typically been a representative of the private 
bankers and has been replaced as easily as ministers of fmance 
(typically serving terms ofless than 10 months) due to effective 
political lobbying of specific banking group interests. 
26 See for example Moreno-Villalaz (2000) and De Jong and Vos 
(2000). 
27 See Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2000). 
28 See IDB (2000) and Vos et al. (2000) for further discussions of 
the design of social protection systems under specific conditions of 
vulnerability to external shocks and wider social sector strategies. 
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